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Enforcing Subrogation Provisions As
"Appropriate Equitable Relief" Under
ERISA Section 502(a)(3)
By LISA N. BLEED*
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED' WELFARE benefit plans2 governed by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19743 ("ERISA")
often contain "subrogation"4 provisions.5 A typical provision provides
that a plan participant who is injured by a third party and later sues
and recovers from the third party will reimburse the plan for benefits
paid for that injury. An illustration demonstrates how subrogation
provisions work in ERISA plans:6 Edgar is seriously injured when he is
hit by a drunk driver. As a result of the accident, Edgar incurs
$175,000 in medical expenses and is unable to work for two months.
* Class of 2002. The author would like to thank Robert S. Unger, Esq., of the San
Francisco law firm Trucker Huss, APC, for his topic proposal and his endless enthusiasm,
encouragement, and assistance.
1. ERISA plans may also be sponsored by "employee organizations," meaning labor
unions, associations, etc. "in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose
* . . of ... dealing with employers concerning an employee benefit plan .... " 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(4) (1994).
2. Employer-sponsored medical and disability plans are examples. The plans at issue
will be described in detail later in this Comment. See infra Section I.B.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1994).
4. For a definition of subrogation, see infra Section I.A.
5. See Danlias F. Howe, Enforcement of Subrogation Provisions in Employee Benefit Plans, 47
LAB. L.J. 657, 667 (1996). See also Brief of Amici Curiae The American Association of
Health Plans et al. at 7, Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 2001 U.S. LEXIS
945 (No. 99-1786) ("reimbursement provisions ... are used extensively.., and have been
in continuous use since the passage of ERISA").
6. This illustration is simplified-these situations are likely to be complicated by
other issues which are not addressed in this Comment. This Comment is limited to a
discussion of whether subrogation provisions are enforceable under ERISA § 502(a) (3).
See, e.g., Amber M. Anstine, ERISA Qualified Subrogation Liens: Should They Be Reduced to
Reflect a Pro Rata Share of Attorney Fees?, 104 DIcK. L. REv. 359 (2000); David M. Kono, Unrav-
eling the Lining of ERISA Health Insurer Pockets-A Vote for National Federal Common Law Adop-
tion of the Make Whole Doctrine, 2000 BYU L. REv. 427 (2000).
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Edgar works for Acme'Company which sponsors the Acme Group
Medical and Disability Plans, and Edgar is covered under both plans.
Each plan contains a subrogation provision 7 which provides that each
Acme plan is entitled to recover any amounts paid by the plan and
recovered from a third party tortfeasor. The Acme Group Medical
Plan pays Edgar's doctors and the hospital where he was treated a
total of $170,000 for its share 8 of expenses incurred as a result of the
accident. The Acme Group Disability Plan pays Edgar benefits totaling
$16,000 to replace a portion of Edgar's salary while he is recovering
and unable to work.
Edgar brings a personal injury claim against the drunk driver who
caused his injuries, and the action settles for $850,000. The Acme
Plans should be entitled to recover from Edgar the $186,000 paid for
Edgar's medical and disability costs, per each plan's subrogation
provision.
If Edgar does not reimburse the Acme Plans as required by the
plan terms, the plan fiduciary9 should be able to bring an action to
enforce the terms of the plan in federal court under ERISA's civil en-
forcement provision, Section 502 (a),10 which explicitly authorizes fed-
eral suits to enforce the terms of an employee benefit plan. Because
the Acme Plans are ERISA plans, the action would logically be
brought as a federal question in federal court.
A problem arises, however, when such a suit is brought in the
Ninth Circuit. Assume Acme Company is a California 1 employer, and
brings suit (as fiduciary of the Acme Group Medical and Disability
Plans) against Edgar to recover monies paid by the plans. Because
both are ERISA plans, the suit is filed in federal court. However, the
federal case is sure to be dismissed based on the Ninth Circuit's deci-
7. See, e.g., FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1259 (9th Cir. 1997) ("if you
bring a liability claim against any third party, benefits payable under this Plan must be
included in the claim, and when the claim is settled you must reimburse the Plan for the
benefits provided.").
8. Assuming that Edgar is responsible for $5,000 of the total $175,000 of medical
expenses incurred.
9. For example, the employer as plan sponsor may be a plan fiduciary. "[A] person is
a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority
or discretionary control respecting management of such plan ... or (iii) he has any discre-
tionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994) [hereinafter § 502(a)].
11. Or the employer is located in any other state within the Ninth Circuit's jurisdic-
tion (California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Alaska, or
Hawaii).
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sion in FMC Medical Plan v. Owens,12 and other Ninth Circuit cases
following Owens. 13 Alternatively, Acme Company may attempt to bring
its action in state court. 14 However, when such claims are brought in
state court, they are often dismissed after a finding that ERISA
preempts state actions which relate to ERISA plans.' 5
Assume now that Acme Company has employees throughout the
country. A Georgia employee, Susan, is injured in Georgia in an acci-
dent similar to Edgar's in California. The Acme Group Medical and
Disability Plans pay benefits similar to Edgar's ($186,000) for Susan's
injuries. If Susan similarly settles with her drunk driver for $850,000,
the plans would simply be able to enforce the subrogation provisions
in federal court in the Eleventh Circuit,1 6 and the Acme plans would
therefore be reimbursed. As this illustrates, the ERISA plan sponsor,
by virtue of having employees in different states, ultimately provides
different benefits to participants based on where a suit may be
brought. Edgar would essentially receive benefits greater than what was
provided for in the plans' 7 for his medical and disability expenses in-
12. 122 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997). See discussion infra Section I.D.1.
13. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Van Kleef, No. C-99-4951-VRW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11253 at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2000) ("This precise issue has been before the Ninth Cir-
cuit, which has ruled consistently that an action for the reimbursement of benefits is not
equitable in nature." Motion to dismiss granted.); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ellis, 202 F.3d
1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Actions by ERISA fiduciaries seeking to enforce an ERISA
plan's contractual reimbursement provisions do not fall within [ERISA § 502(a) (3)].
Therefore, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Reynolds Metals' action."); Cement
Masons Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Stone, 197 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) ("This
case is controlled by our decision two years ago in Owens, in which we held that reimburse-
ment for payments appropriately made by a plan is not an available remedy under [ERISA
§ 502(a) (3)]." Dismissal affirmed.).
14. See Owens, 122 F.3d at 1262 n.2 ("FMC will have to pursue its claims under the
Plans in state court if it wishes to receive the reimbursement it is allegedly owed by
Owens.").
15. "[T]he provisions of this [title] ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ...." 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1994). See also Funk Mfg. Co. v. Franklin, 927 P.2d 944, 947-48 (Kan. 1996) (Supreme
Court of Kansas dismissed state court subrogation action, stating: "[this action] does not
fall within the state court concurrent jurisdiction .... Rather, this action falls directly
within [ERISA § 502(a) (3)] .... which permits civil actions by fiduciaries seeking ... relief
to ... enforce [a benefit plan's] provisions or terms .... [S]uch actions must be brought
in federal court.").
16. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1998).
17. Edgar makes a recovery for his medical expenses from both the tortfeasor and the
plans, even though, under the terms of the plans, Edgar's benefits are calculated by sub-
tracting from what is paid by the plans to Edgar the amount he recovers from the
tortfeasor. This leaves Edgar with $850,000 (disregarding attorney fees, etc.), in addition to
the $186,000 in benefits paid by the plans to his medical providers. See Howe, supra note 5,
at 663 ("Permitting the tort victim to seek reimbursement of medical expenses from his
insurance carrier as well as from a third-party tortfeasor, without a mechanism for the
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curred, while Susan would receive the benefits as defined by the terms
of the plan.' 8 Thus, Edgar and Susan receive different benefits even
though they are participants under the same terms in the same medical
and disability plans. Further, the plan sponsor is met with choice of
forum issues' 9 and may even be left with no remedy at all in some
states for enforcing its plan's subrogation provision.20
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the foundations and
implications of the Ninth Circuit's approach regarding the enforce-
ment of subrogation provisions in the context of ERISA plans. First,
this Comment describes the ERISA plans and provisions at issue.
Next, it examines the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associ-
ates,2' and the implications of that interpretation for ERISA plans with
subrogation provisions. The Comment then contrasts the Ninth Cir-
cuit's approach to the approach of other circuits, discussing how the
Ninth Circuit's approach directly conflicts with the goals of ERISA
and the language of Section 502 (a) (3). Finally, the Comment explains
why the United States Supreme Court should reject the Ninth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of Mertens and Section 502(a) (3) when it consid-
ers Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson22 in the October
2001 term. By rejecting the Ninth Circuit's approach and interpreting
ERISA's civil enforcement provision to allow for the enforcement of
subrogation provisions within ERISA plans, the Court will be adopting
an approach that is consistent with the goals and mandates of ERISA.
insurer to obtain repayment, unjustly enriches the insured by allowing for a double
recovery.").
18. Susan would be forced to repay the plans from her tort settlement thereby leaving
her with $664,000 (disregarding attorney fees).
19. Multistate plans may be faced with having to decide in which court (state or fed-
eral), if any, to bring an action to enforce their subrogation provisions, depending on
where the insured lives or where the injury occurred. For example, in the Ninth Circuit,
the current choice seems to be state court. See supra note 14. However, the same national
plan may have to bring suit in federal court for similar facts arising elsewhere, e.g., in the
Eleventh Circuit. See Sanders, 138 F.3d at 1352 n.5 ("ERISA preemption would have pre-
cluded Blue Cross from suing the Sanderses at law in state court.").
20. See discussion infra Section II.B.
21. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
22. No. 98-56472, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1771, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000), cert.
granted, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 945, at *1 (Jan. 22, 2001).
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I. Background
A. Subrogation Defined
Subrogation is formally defined as "[t]he substitution of one
party for another whose debt the party pays, entitling the paying party
to rights, remedies, or securities that would otherwise belong to the
debtor."23 The Ninth Circuit has recognized:
Subrogation is the insurer's right to be put in the position of the
insured, in order to recover from third parties who are legally re-
sponsible to the insured for a loss paid by the insurer .... The
right of subrogation, even when created by agreement between the
insured and the insurer, "is designed to compel discharge of the
obligation by one who, in equity, should bear the loss." 24
Traditionally, in the insurance context, an insurer asserting its
right to subrogation is "viewed as 'standing in the shoes' of the in-
sured so that the insurer's rights are equal to, but no greater than,
those of the insured."25 A subrogation clause in an insurance policy
might "giv[e] an insurer the right to take legal action against a third
party responsible for a loss to an insured for which a claim has been
paid."26 This type of subrogation provision is typically not included in
ERISA welfare benefit plans,2 7 presumably because ERISA plans
should not be involved in, nor should plan assets be use for, litigating
claims on behalf of participants against third party tortfeasors. 28
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1440 (7th ed. 1999).
24. Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers Assoc. Health & Benefit Plan, 64 F.3d 1389, 1392
(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 16 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d. § 61:1 at 75 (rev. ed. 1983) (empha-
sis added)).
25. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 3.10(a)(1), at 219 (1998).
26. HARVEY W. RUBIN, DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 315 (3d ed. 1995). For exam-
ple, in the property insurance context:
[I1f a third party, through negligence, damages an insured's car and the insured's
insurance company pays to restore the car, the insurance company has recourse
against the third party for the costs involved. The insured cannot sue the third
party for damage, since if successful, the insured could collect twice for the same
damage.
Id.
27. See THOMAS H. LAWRENCE & JOHN M. RUSSELL, ERISA SUBROGATION 4 (2000).
28. Rather, plan resources should be used primarily to pay plan benefits. ERISA ex-
plicitly requires a plan fiduciary to "discharge his duties ... solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and-(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits
to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of adminis-
tering the plan .... " 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (1994). See also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, No. 99-
1529, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2458 at *15 (Mar. 21, 2001) (observing that "[r]equiring ERISA
administrators to ... contend with litigation would undermine the congressional goal of
'minimizing the administrative and financial burdens' on plan administrators-burdens
ultimately borne by the beneficiaries") (citations omitted).
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More typically, reimbursement-type subrogation provisions29 are
found in ERISA plans.30 "Typical reimbursement provisions provide
that if benefits are paid for an injury and the covered person recovers
from a third party, the covered person must reimburse the plan."'
Reimbursement-type subrogation provisions differ from tradi-
tional subrogation provisions in that they do not require the plan fidu-
ciary to step into the shoes of the insured to sue on the insured's
behalf. Instead, if an insured receives a personal injury recovery, the
insured has a contractual obligation to reimburse the plan for any
benefits that were paid by the plan for that injury.3 2
As an alternative to subrogation, an ERISA plan might simply ex-
clude coverage for any injuries caused by a third person.3 3 The plan
may contain language that states, for example, "the plan may elect to
advance payment for medical/disability expenses incurred for an in-
jury or illness caused by a third party .... The Administrator has the
right to recover in full the medical or disability expenses advanced
. "... ,34 In essence, an exclusionary provision says that the plan simply
does not cover injuries caused by third parties, though it may elect to
advance to the participant the money to pay for those injuries on the
condition that the participant reimburse the plan if and when she re-
covers from a third party.3 5
29. The term "subrogation" will be used to refer to either of these types of subroga-
tion provisions in this Comment unless a distinction is warranted. In light of the solution
proposed in this Comment infra Section III, distinguishing the types of subrogation provi-
sions is not necessary, though in the Ninth Circuit, the distinction may be determinative.
See discussion infta Section I.D.1. See also Amicus Curiae Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Subrogation
Professionals, Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 1 n.2, Great-West Life &Annuity Ins. Co. (No.
99-1786) (observing, "[i]n this brief and in the case law, the terms "subrogation" ... and
"reimbursement" ... are used interchangeably").
30. See, e.g., ERISA plan language in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ellis, 202 F.3d 1246, 1247
(9th Cir. 2000) (stating "If the Plans paid for health care services, supplies or treatment
and you receive payment from a third party, you must reimburse the Plans, but not more
than the amount of the third-party payment you received.").
31. LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 4.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 5.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d
608, 614 (7th Cir. 1995). (The medical plan at issue contained an exclusionary provision:
"Medical care benefits are not payable... when the Injury or Illness . .. occurs through the act or
omission of another person .... Provident may elect to advance payment for medical care
expenses ....").
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B. ERISA and ERISA Welfare Benefit Plans
This Comment is limited to a discussion of subrogation provi-
sions within ERISA welfare benefit plans.36 Thus, a brief discussion of
these plans and the regulatory framework in which they exist is
warranted.
One of the primary goals of ERISA is:
[P]rotect[ing] ... participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to partici-
pants and beneficiaries... [and] by establishing standards of con-
duct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanc-
tions, and ready access to the Federal courts. 3 7
ERISA accomplishes this enormous goal in part by its broad pre-
emption provisions,3 8 including ERISA Section 514(a)19 which pro-
vides that "the provisions of this [tide] ... shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to [an] em-
ployee benefit plan.'' 40 ERISA does not require that employees be pro-
vided with ERISA plans, but if a plan sponsor does provide these
plans, ERISA governs the plan sponsor's conduct regarding the plans.
For example, ERISA requires that the plans be "maintained pursuant
to a written instrument 41 and that the fiduciary administer the plan
"in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan .... ,42 ERISA's broad preemption provision enables plan fiduci-
aries to fulfill this mandate consistently, even among states with differ-
ent laws.43
ERISA comprehensively regulates employee benefit plans, includ-
ing employee welfare benefit plans:
36. Subrogation clauses are also found in other types of insurance policies, for exam-
ple property and liability insurance policies. See RUBIN, supra note 26, at 315.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
38. A thorough discussion of ERISA preemption and the current state of the law sur-
rounding ERISA preemption is impossible here, given the scope; however, for an excellent
discussion of preemption in the context at hand, see LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 27,
at 49-61.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
40. Id.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (D) (1994).
43. See New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995) (concluding that "[t]he basic thrust of [ERISA preemption] was
to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administra-
tion of employee benefit plans"). See also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, No. 99-1529, 2001 U.S.
LEXIS 2458 at *15 (March 21, 2001) ("Requiring ERISA administrators to master the rele-
vant laws of 50 states" defeats Congress's goal of "minimizing the burdens" on those admin-
istrators who provide benefit plans.) (citations omitted).
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The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan"
mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is here-
after established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of pro-
viding for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospi-
tal care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment. .... 44
Welfare plans that typically include subrogation provisions are medi-
cal plans (including medical, surgical and hospital) and disability
plans (including short and long-term disability) .45
1. Benefit Plan Terms Under ERISA
ERISA does not dictate which plans must be provided to employ-
ees, nor what provisions such plans must contain. 46 ERISA neither for-
bids nor requires that welfare plans contain subrogation provisions.47
Rather, "[a] subrogation provision affects the level of benefits con-
ferred by the plan, and ERISA leaves that issue to the private parties
creating the plan."48 ERISA does require, however, that plans "be es-
tablished and maintained pursuant to a written instrument, ' 49 and
that they "specify the basis on which payments are made to and from
the plan. '15 0
Further, an ERISA fiduciary is charged with discharging his duties
"in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan."51 Thus, if a plan contains a subrogation provision, the fiduciary
is under an obligation to enforce that provision. "It is well settled that
plan fiduciaries have a fiduciary duty to enforce plan terms as written,
including [subrogation] provisions."52
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
45. See, e.g., FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997) (at issue were the
subrogation clauses in a health care plan and in short and long-term disability plans).
46. See Brief of Amici Curiae The American Association of Health Plans et al. at 17,
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. (No. 99-1786).
47. See Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996) ("As with many
other substantive terms of welfare plans, ERISA says nothing about subrogation provisions.
ERISA neither requires a welfare plan to contain a subrogation clause nor does it bar such
clauses or otherwise regulate their content.").
48. Wailer v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir. 1997).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (4) (1994).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (D) (1994).
52. LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 13.
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2. The Civil Enforcement Provision-ERISA § 502(a)
Central to the problem this Comment addresses is the interpreta-
tion of ERISA's civil enforcement provision and whether it allows for
the enforcement of subrogation provisions. ERISA § 502 (a) 53 provides
that:
A civil action may be brought ... (3) by a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provi-
sion of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.5 4
The Supreme Court has read ERISA's civil enforcement provision
to be exclusive.5 5 Therefore if an ERISA plan includes a subrogation
provision and the plan fiduciary wishes to enforce such provision,
then its only opportunity to do so is under ERISA's civil enforcement
provision.5 6
C. Related Supreme Court Case Law
1. FMC Corp. v. Holliday5 7
In 1990, the Supreme Court heard a case in which an employer
brought suit to recover medical benefits paid by its ERISA plan for
injuries sustained in an automobile accident. 58 The injured plan par-
ticipant sued the driver of the automobile that injured her, and the
case settled. 59 The employer asserted its right to reimbursement of
medical benefits paid under the subrogation provision in the plan.
The insured refused to reimburse the plan, claiming that state law
precluded subrogation. 60
The Court considered whether ERISA preempts state law "pre-
cluding employee welfare benefit plans from exercising subrogation
rights on a claimant's tort recovery." 6' The Court held that ERISA did
preempt such state law. However, the holding was limited to self-
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) ("The deliberate care
with which ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were drafted and the balancing of policies
embodied in its choice of remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA's civil
enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive.").
56. Assuming that ERISA preempts a state law claim for enforcement of a plan's sub-
rogation provision.
57. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
58. See id. at 55.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 54.
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funded 62 ERISA plans because self-funded ERISA plans are exempt
"from state laws that 'regulate insurance.' ' '63
2. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
64
The Ninth Circuit's refusal to allow for the enforcement of subro-
gation provisions in ERISA plans stems from its interpretation of Mer-
tens. 6 5 At issue in Mertens was "whether a nonfiduciary who knowingly
participates in the breach of a fiduciary duty imposed by [ERISA] ...
is liable for losses that an employee benefit plan suffers as a result of
the breach.'66 Pension plan participants sued an actuary-who had
provided services to the plan, and who had allegedly underestimated
the plan's funding obligations which resulted in a termination of the
pension plan-for breach of fiduciary duty owed to the plan.67
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that a suit for damages
resulting from the breach was not authorized under ERISA's civil en-
forcement provision, Section 502(a)(3), which authorizes suits for
"appropriate equitable relief." The majority saw the remedy sought for
breach of fiduciary duty as monetary damages and held that such a rem-
edy was not "equitable" relief.68
D. Conflicting Interpretations of Mertens and "Appropriate
Equitable Relief"
1. The Ninth Circuit's Approach
In 1995, the Ninth Circuit explicitly recognized that subrogation
gives rise to a claim for equitable relief.69 However, ignoring its impli-
cation in Barnes that a claim to enforce a subrogation provision in an
ERISA plan is equitable in nature, the Ninth Circuit (contrary to other
circuits7°), beginning with its decision in FMC Medical Plan v. Owens,7'
62. "Self-funded employee benefit plans are those where benefits are paid directly
from an employer's general assets." LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 53. On the
other hand, in insured plans, "the employer plan sponsor has an insurance policy with a
commercial insurance company, which collects premiums and is at risk to pay benefits
from its own assets." Id.
63. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 61 (noting further that "employee benefit plans that are in-
sured are subject to indirect state insurance regulation ... and are consequently bound by
state insurance regulations... ").
64. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
65. See discussion infra Section I.D.1.
66. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 249-50.
67. See id. at 250.
68. Id. at 255.
69. See Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers Assoc. Health & Benefit Plan, 64 F.3d 1389,
1392 (9th Cir. 1995). See supra text accompanying note 24.
70. See discussion infra Section I.D.2.
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has consistently held that the enforcement of subrogation provisions
does not constitute "appropriate equitable relief' under ERISA
§ 502(a) (3). Thus, under the current state of the law in the Ninth
Circuit, subrogation provisions are not enforceable under ERISA.
The Ninth Circuit narrowly interpreted the Mertens decision in a
1997 case involving enforcement of the subrogation provisions in
medical and disability plans in FMC Medical Plan v. Owens.72 Owens
was injured in an automobile accident and, as a result, the FMC medi-
cal, short-term, and long-term disability plans paid approximately
$50,000. 73 Each of the plans contained the following subrogation
provision:
If you bring a liability claim against any third party, benefits paya-
ble under this Plan must be included in the claim, and when the
claim is settled you must reimburse the Plan for the benefits pro-
vided .... Unless you sign the Company's third party reimburse-
ment form, the Claims Administrator will not process any claim
where there is a possible liability of a third party.74
Owens signed the reimbursement form, which contained similar lan-
guage.75 Owens sued the other driver and received a settlement of
$100,000.76
FMC, as plan fiduciary, brought suit in federal court under ERISA
§ 502(a) (3) to enforce the plans' subrogation provisions. The district
court held that FMC did have a right to reimbursement under the
terms of the plans and determined that subrogation was an equitable
remedy authorized by ERISA § 502 (a) (3).7 7 The Ninth Circuit re-
versed based on its interpretation of Mertens, stating "[t] he substance
of the remedy sought by FMC is money damages for Owens's alleged
breach of the Plans, which are contracts .... When the substance of
the relief is monetary ... such a remedy is not available under [ERISA
§ 502(a) (3)]."78
The court noted that the provisions at issue were not traditional
subrogation provisions, but were instead contractual reimbursement pro-
visions79 and implied the distinction was crucial:
71. 122 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997).
72. Id.




77. See id. at 1260.
78. Id. at 1262. "[W]hat [FMC] seeks is not a form of equitable relief recognized by
the narrow construction of [ERISA § 502 (a) (3)] as required by Mertens." Id.
79. See id. at 1260.
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The district court held that FMC's right under the Plans was that of
subrogation [which it considered] to be an equitable remedy ...
The district court's classification of FMC's right under the Plans is
flawed. FMC's rights under the Plans is not one of subrogation ....
FMC's claim is one of contractual reimbursement, not
subrogation.80
Further, the court read Mertens to say that the term "other equita-
ble relief' in ERISA § 502(a) (3) is limited solely to "injunction, man-
damus and restitution," and that restitution is limited to the "return of
'ill-gotten' assets or profits taken from a plan."'
FMC does not request an injunction or a writ of mandamus. Like-
wise, what FMC seeks is not restitution. Restitution is referred to in
Mertens as the return of "ill-gotten" assets or profits taken from a
plan. Owens did not obtain FMC's funds by any fraud or wrong-
doing. Owens obtained the funds pursuant to the Plans, which ob-
ligated the funds to be paid to him under the circumstances of this
case. FMC's claim is for reimbursement of money that Owens right-
fully received under the Plans. Essentially, FMC seeks a breach of
contract claim for monetary relief, albeit under its classification of
"equitable reimbursement."8 2
Since Owens, the decision not to allow the enforcement of subro-
gation provisions under ERISA § 502 (a) (3) has been followed without
question in the Ninth Circuit. 3 However, the United States Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari on this issue in two Ninth Circuit
cases. In the first, Reynolds Metals v. Ellis,8 4 the Court granted certiorari
but the case was dismissed at the request of the parties.8 5 Immediately
thereafter, the Court granted certiorari again, in Great-West Life & An-
nuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson.8 6
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co., Knudson was seriously
injured in an auto accident and her ERISA plan paid in excess of
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1261.
82. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ellis, 202 F.3d 1246, 1248 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The
existence of such controlling Ninth Circuit precedent should end the matter."); Great-
West Life & Annuity v. Knudson, No. 98-56472, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1771, at *5 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2000) ("[W]e have recently reaffirmed the holding in Owens and, therefore, decline
to seek en banc review."); Cement Masons Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Stone, 197 F.3d
1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) ("This case is controlled by our decision in Owens, in which we
held that reimbursement for payments appropriately made by a plan is not an available
remedy under [ERISA § 502(a)(3)]."); Fed. Express Corp. v. Van Kleef, No. C-99-4951-
VRW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11253 at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2000).
84. 202 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2000); cert. granted, 531 U.S. 1009 (2000); cert. dismissed,
531 U.S. 1061 (2000).
85. See Cert. Granted, THE NAT'L L.J., Feb. 5, 2001, at A15.
86. No. 98-56472, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1771 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000), cert. granted, No.
99-1786, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 945 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2001).
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$400,000 for the injuries.87 Knudson received a settlement of $650,000
for the accident and the plan and insurer brought suit to enforce the
plan's subrogation provision.8 8 The Ninth Circuit held that such "re-
imbursement . . . is not equitable relief within the meaning of [Sec-
tion 502(a) (3)]."89
2. A Contrasting Approach
The Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's Owens
rationale in Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Sanders.90 Sanders, who was cov-
ered under an ERISA medical plan, was injured in an automobile acci-
dent.9 1 The plan, which contained a subrogation provision,92 paid
approximately $12,000 for her medical treatment. 9 3 Sanders success-
fully brought suit against the other driver and recovered $200,000.9 4
Blue Cross sued under ERISA § 502(a) (3) for specific performance to
enforce the subrogation provision. 95 The Eleventh Circuit held that
Blue Cross had demonstrated that specific performance of the subro-
gation provision was "plausibly 'equitable"' 9 6  under Section
502 (a) (3).
The Eleventh Circuit refused to interpret Mertens as the Ninth
Circuit had in Owens and allowed the plan to recover, observing that
"Owens appears to be based on an unduly narrow reading of Mertens
.... Relying on Mertens, the Owens court held that 'equitable relief
87. See id. at *2.
88. See id. at *3. The plan provision stated that if a
third party may be liable or legally responsible for expenses incurred by a Cov-
ered Person for: an illness; or a sickness; or a bodily injury ... the plan would pay
the covered expenses, but would have the right to recover from the Covered Per-
son any payment for benefits paid for the treatment of such loss .. .which the
Covered Person is entitled to receive from the third party.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. (No. 99-1786).
89. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1771, at *5.
90. 138 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1998).
91. See id at 1350.
92. The plan provision stated:
If the Claims Administrator pays or provides any benefits for a Member under this
Plan, it is subrogated to all rights of recovery which that Member has in contract,
tort or otherwise against any person ... for the amounts of benefits paid or pro-
vided .... [A]nd in addition . . . the Member agrees to reimburse the Claims
Administrator from the recovered money that amount of benefits the Claims Ad-





96. Id. at 1352 n.5.
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includes only injunction, mandamus and restitution."9 7 The court
concluded that specific performance as a remedy is "a traditional form
of equitable relief'98 and specific performance as a remedy is not "un-
available" under Section 502(a) (3), according to Mertens.99
The Eighth Circuit too held that a plan fiduciary's suit to enforce
a subrogation provision was permitted under ERISA § 502 (a) (3). 100 In
Ford, the insured was injured when she fell in a supermarket. 10' Her
ERISA medical plan paid nearly $40,000 for her injuries. 0 2 Ms. Ford
sued the supermarket, and her suit settled for $150,000.103 The ERISA
plan sought to recover the amount it had paid for the injuries, pursu-
ant to the plan's subrogation agreement. The Eighth Circuit held that
the suit was authorized under ERISA § 502 (a) (3) as "appropriate eq-
uitable relief," noting that "[the plan fiduciary's] allegation that Ford
admittedly failed to reimburse [the plan] as required by the subroga-
tion clause is a claim that Ford failed to comply with a term of the
[p1lan." 0 4
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that a plan administrator seek-
ing to enforce the plan's subrogation provision was indeed "seeking
an equitable remedy against [the defendant] to ensure her compli-
ance with the terms of the Plan."' 05
II. The Problem: The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of
Mertens and Section 502(a)(3) Is Inconsistent
With ERISA
ERISA requires that plans be maintained pursuant to plan provi-
sions and that fiduciaries discharge their duties in accordance with
plan documents. Since ERISA does not preclude plan sponsors from
including subrogation provisions in their ERISA plans, subrogation
provisions of all types should be enforceable by fiduciaries under Sec-
tion 502(a) (3) as "appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce the
terms of the plan." The Ninth Circuit does not agree. 10 6 The implica-
tions of the Ninth Circuit's stance are significant for ERISA plans, es-
97. Id. at 1352-53 n.5.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See S. Council of Indus. Workers v. Ford, 8 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 968.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 969.
105. Admin. Comm. v. Gauf, 188 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1999).
106. See supra Section I.D.1.
[Vol. 35
SUBROGATION ENFORCEMENT UNDER ERISA
pecially those plans with participants in multiple states, as
demonstrated in the example of Acme Company.10 7 Enforcement of
such provisions currently varies by circuit and as a result, differing
benefits may be received by similarly situated participants in the same
plan merely based on where the suit may be brought. This defeats
ERISA's goal of uniformity.108 Further, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
may result in a windfall for some plan participants in that they may
recover for the same injury twice, despite the benefit plan's contrac-
tual terms to the contrary.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit directs that suits to enforce such provi-
sions in employee plans should be brought in state courtl09 as there is
no federal subject matter jurisdiction (because the Ninth Circuit
deems that enforcement of such "subrogation" provisions is not per-
mitted under ERISA). This solution is problematic, however, since
state courts generally conclude that they do not have jurisdiction over
actions brought under ERISA § 502(a).' 0 Under the current legal
framework, plans in the Ninth Circuit may be left without a method of
enforcing subrogation provisions in ERISA plans, despite ERISA's
mandate that plans be administered in accordance with their terms. 1
A. Mertens Does Not Preclude the Enforcement of Subrogation
Provisions
In Mertens, the United States Supreme Court held that ERISA
§ 502 (a) (3) did not authorize a suit for compensatory damages for
losses resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty to the plan because
107. See supra text accompanying notes 6-20.
108. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (explaining that,
as evidenced by ERISA's broad preemption provision, ERISA is intended to:
Ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of bene-
fits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of com-
plying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal
Government. Otherwise, the inefficiencies created could work to the detriment of
plan beneficiaries.).
109. See FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1262 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) ("FMC will
have to pursue its claims under the Plans in state court if it wishes to receive the reimburse-
ment it is allegedly owed by Owens.").
110. See, e.g., Funk Mfg. Co. v. Franklin, 927 P.2d 944, 947-48 (concluding,
[t]his action falls directly within 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) of the ERISA civil en-
forcement section, which permits civil action by fiduciaries seeking injunctive and
equitable relief to redress alleged violations of a benefit plan or to enforce its
provisions or terms. In conjunction with 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), such actions
must be brought in federal court.).
111. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (D) (1994).
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such an award was .not "a remedy traditionally viewed as
'equitable."' 12
[W1 hat petitioners in fact seek is nothing other than compensatory
damages-monetary relief for all losses their plan sustained as a re-
sult of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties. Money damages are,
of course, the classic form of legal relief .... And though we have
never interpreted the precise phrase 'other appropriate equitable
relief,' we have construed ...similar language ... to preclude
,awards for compensatory or punitive damages."' 113
Even if the Court correctly read Section 502(a) (3) as precluding
compensatory or punitive damages, it does not logically follow that the
enforcement of plan terms should be precluded simply because the
payment of money would result from a judgment. Merely because money
changes hands does not automatically make the relief legal, as distinct
from equitable. Rather, "[a] judicial order requiring [participants] to
reimburse [a] plan in accordance with the plan terms is the sort of
relief that is typically available in equity because it would compel spe-
cific. performance of an obligation to pay money."'1 14
In Mertens, the Supreme Court undertook the task of interpreting
the phrase "other appropriate equitable relief' under Section
502(a)(3) in the context of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty." 5 En-
forcement of plan terms was not at issue in Mertens. The Court explic-
itly noted that "[n] o one suggest[ed] that any term of the.., plan has
been violated, nor would any be enforced by the requested judgment.' 1 6 That
language-taken with ERISA's command that plans be administered
"in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan,"I17-makes it clear that Mertens is intended to apply only to cases
where monetary relief is sought in conjunction with a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty, not to cases where the relief sought is the enforce-
ment of plan terms. Indeed, the very language of Section 502(a) (3)
expressly authorizes a suit "to enforce . . .the terms of the plan."" 18
The Ninth Circuit also narrowed the Mertens holding by constru-
ing it to mean that "other appropriate equitable relief' allows only
traditional forms of equitable relief, that is, "injunction, mandamus
112. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
113. Id.
114. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15, Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. (No. 99-1786).
115. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.
116. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (D) (1994).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B)(ii) (1994).
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and restitution."' 19 However, the precise language in Mertens is that
"'equitable relief' . . . [refers] to those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus and restitu-
tion, but not compensatory damages). " 120 The specific language of
Mertens, then, does not preclude, for example, a suit for specific per-
formance to enforce the terms of a plan.
The Ninth Circuit further limited the relief available under Mer-
tens by requiring, under a claim of restitution, a showing of ill-gotten
assets.1 21 The court found that restitution was not available since
"Owens did not gain FMC's medical payments by any form of fraud,
duress or unconscionable behavior." 22 The court rationalized that be-
cause Owens received the funds pursuant to the plan, he did not ob-
tain the "funds by any fraud or wrong-doing." 123 Even if the Court did
intend to limit a claim of restitution to a case where assets were "ill-
gotten," 124 arguably Owens did not rightfully receive the benefits in
question-Owens received the benefits subject to the plan's require-
ment that he reimburse the plan, which he did not do. Allowing a
plan to recover those benefits wrongfully withheld by the participant
is equitable relief:
[A] n action to enforce a reimbursement term of a plan is properly
viewed as an action for equitable relief because it seeks to prevent
unjust enrichment of the participant or beneficiary and because
the relief is measured by the unjust gain to the defendant, not by
the loss to the plan.125
In Owens and in subsequent Ninth Circuit cases, the participant is
allowed to recover from both the tortfeasor and the ERISA plan, even
though the benefits are received subject to an obligation to repay the
plan if a recovery is made from a third party. Such unjust enrichment
should be remediable under ERISA § 502 (a) (3). As the Third Circuit
has wisely observed, "it would be inequitable to permit the [insureds]
to partake of the benefits of the Plan and then, after they had received
a substantial settlement, invoke common law principles to establish a
119. FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1997).
120. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
121. See Owens, 122 F.3d. at 1261.
122. Id.
123. Id. (stating: "FMC's claim is for reimbursement of money that Owens rightfully
received under the Plans").
124. Though the Court has since hinted that "wrong-doing" may not be required to
state an action of restitution under ERISA. See Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon
Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250 (2000).
125. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. (No. 99-1786).
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legal justification for their refusal to satisfy their end of the
bargain."12 6
B. The Risk of No Remedy at All
The Eleventh Circuit, in Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Sanders,12 7
held that the risk of no remedy was enough to make the relief equita-
ble.' 28 In considering whether Blue Cross could enforce the ERISA
plan's subrogation provision under Section 502(a) (3), the court
concluded:
Blue Cross essentially seeks specific performance of the reimburse-
ment provision of the Plan. Specific performance is an equitable
remedy available when legal remedies are inadequate. Legal reme-
dies were inadequate here because ERISA preemption would have
precluded Blue Cross from suing the Sanderses at law in state court
.... Moreover, because Blue Cross had no other available remedy,
specific performance is 'appropriate equitable relief' under [Section
502 (a) (3)].129
The dilemma encountered in the Ninth Circuit, however, ex-
poses plan fiduciaries in that jurisdiction to the risk that they will have
no remedy at all for enforcing subrogation provisions contained in
their plans. The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that subrogation
provisions are not enforceable under Section 502(a) (3). 130 In Owens,
the Ninth Circuit directs that any claim for reimbursement must be
pursued in state court.'31 However, when such an action is brought in
state court, it risks dismissal. For example, in Jefferson-Pilot Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Krafka,13 2 plaintiff was the insurer of an ERISA medical
plan in which Krafka was a participant. 133 The insurer paid Krafka's
medical expenses (totaling some $22,000) resulting from an auto acci-
dent. 134 Krafka recovered $410,000 from an auto insurance policy,
and the medical insurer sought to enforce the reimbursement provi-
sion in the medical plan.' - 5 The court held that ERISA preempted a
126. Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127-28 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the
plan's subrogation provisions are enforceable under ERISA).
127. 138 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1998). See also supra Section I.D.2.
128. See id. at 1354.
129. Id. at 1352 n.5 (citations omitted).
130. See supra note 13.
131. FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1262 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1997).
132. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723 (2d Dist. 1996).
133. See id. at 725.
134. See id.
135. See id. The reimbursement contract stated, "I, Ronald Krafka, understand and ac-
knowledge that my medical plan has a subrogation/reimbursement provision which pro-
vides that medical benefits paid under the plan are to be reimbursed . .. from any
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state claim for reimbursement under the medical plan and the state
claim should therefore be dismissed. 136 The court observed:
A cause of action is available in federal court to an ERISA fiduciary
seeking, as here, reimbursement for medical expenses paid ....
The ERISA fiduciary can bring an equitable restitution action in
federal court to enforce the reimbursement provision of the plan
and to prevent the unjust enrichment of the employee. 137
Thus, in California, claims to enforce subrogation provisions in
ERISA plans are dismissed in state court and plaintiffs are directed to
federal court; however, the Ninth Circuit dismisses the same issue, re-
gardless of how the claim is framed. 138 Describing this dilemma, a
recent appellate court in California remarked: "Under KraJka, the
plaintiff must pursue its reimbursement claim in federal court. Under
Owens, by contrast, the plaintiff must pursue its reimbursement claim
in state court." 13 9 Thus, applicable case law "place[s] a plaintiff seek-
ing reimbursement under the terms of an employee benefit plan in a
Catch 22."140 Where a plan fiduciary is unable to enforce the terms of
an ERISA plan, he is in violation of ERISA's mandate that plans be
administered in accordance with their terms.
C. The Ninth Circuit's Approach Will Adversely Impact ERISA
Plans and Plan Participants
Plans contain subrogation provisions to control the costs of pro-
viding benefits. 14' "As cost containment continues to be a concern,
plan fiduciaries must make renewed efforts to view the [subrogation]
provisions in their plans as essential elements of their overall cost con-
tainment efforts."'142 If subrogation provisions are necessary to the fi-
nancial viability of ERISA plans, then offering such provisions in the
form of reimbursement-type subrogation provisions provides a valua-
payments, awards, or settlements which may be due by any third party because of my injury
.... " Id. at 725 n.3.
136. See id. at 726-27.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ellis, 202 F.3d 1246, 1248 (9th Cir. 2000) (suit for
equitable reimbursement); Cement Masons Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Stone, 197 F.3d
1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1999) (suit for restitution); etc.
139. Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. McCracken, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473, 476
(1st Dist. 2000) (citations omitted).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Paris v. Iron Workers Trust Fund, No. 99-1558, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
6883, at *8-9 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 2000) ("[S]elf-funded ERISA plans generally have very
limited resources that they must use for the benefit of all their participants. Subrogation is
an extremely important tool for maintaining the financial viability of such plans.").
142. LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 3.
Summer 2001 ]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
ble benefit to plan participants; that is, the plan initially pays benefits
for the injury and expects repayment only if there is a recovery (versus
an exclusionary provision in which a plan simply excludes coverage for
injuries caused by a third party). However, if no method of enforce-
ment exists for subrogation provisions, plans may simply exclude ben-
efits for injuries caused by third parties in order to reduce costs t.1 4
Imagine a plan participant's surprise when the medical bills resulting
from a car accident or medical malpractice, for example, are simply
not paid by her medical plan. 144
The Ninth Circuit's approach may also make it difficult for em-
ployers to self-fund 145 their ERISA welfare benefit plans. As the cost
of providing health benefits continues to rise, self-funding provides "a
viable alternative for funding health benefits, and ... a cost-efficient
method of providing expanded benefit coverage .. ".. 146 In a self-
funded plan, the plan sponsor is responsible for paying the claims of
the insureds, 147 and therefore bears the risk that claim costs will be
high. Subrogation provisions are "commonly found in [self-funded]
plans, [and] are designed to preserve plan assets which can be used to
pay enhanced benefits . . . , ,,14" but if subrogation provisions are not
enforceable, plan sponsors may have to cut back other benefits or may
be forced into insuring their plans.
In FMC Corp. v. Holliday,149 the Court held that ERISA preempts
state laws which forbid the enforcement of subrogation provisions in
self-funded ERISA plans. 15 0 Though not asked to consider whether
such provisions would be enforceable under ERISA, implicit in the
Court's opinion is that ERISA does permit the enforcement of subroga-
tion provisions. The dissent's language is telling: Stevens inquired,
143. See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, Consumers Across the Nation Are Facing Sharp Increases in
Health Care Costs in 2001, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at 40 (observing:
Consumers across the country will face double-digit increases in their healthcare
costs starting [in January 2001], reflecting the biggest surge in medical inflation
since the early 1990's .... Rates are going up dramatically in some parts of the
country .... Some employers have reduced their contributions and some have
changed the benefits" to make them less costly .. .
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
144. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of Health Plans et al. at 19, Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. (No. 99-1786).
145. See supra note 62.
146. Brief of Amicus Curiae of Self-Insurance Inst. of Am., Inc. (SIIA) in Support of
Petitioner at 7, Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. (No. 99-1786).
147. See LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 53.
148. Brief of Amicus Curiae of Self-Insurance Inst. of Am., Inc. (SIIA) in Support of
Petitioner at 7, Great-West Lfe & Annuity Ins. Co. (No. 99-1786).
149. See discussion supra Section I.C.1.
150. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990).
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"[w]hy should a self-insured plan have a right to enforce a subroga-
tion clause against an injured employee while an insured plan may
not?" 15 1 FMC Corp. v. Holliday sends a confusing message to plan spon-
sors in the Ninth Circuit-those plan sponsors have been told by the
Ninth Circuit that subrogation provisions are not enforceable. 152
Finally, if the language in Owens is read to allow only for the en-
forcement of traditional subrogation provisions, ERISA fiduciaries will
have to include those provisions (unless they instead choose to alto-
gether exclude coverage for injuries caused by third parties), and will
be forced into litigating against third parties who cause injuries to par-
ticipants. Plan assets, however, are to be used "for the exclusive pur-
pose of... providing benefits to participants... 153 not for litigating
the tort claims of individual participants against third parties. Further,
a plan fiduciary under ERISA is ordered to "[defray the] reasonable
expenses of administering the plan"154 -an impossible task if a plan
must get involved in costly tort litigation.
The high cost of litigating may thus preclude plans from contain-
ing traditional subrogation provisions. If reimbursement-type subroga-
tion provisions are not enforceable, as currently in the Ninth Circuit,
a plan fiduciary's only choices will be to either include exclusionary
provisions or no subrogation provisions at all (thus driving up the cost
of providing the benefits)-in either case, participants are ultimately
harmed by a loss of benefits. 155
Finally, if the Ninth Circuit's approach is allowed to stand, plans
with participants in multiple states156 will be subject to "considerable
inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those
employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without
such plans to refrain from adopting them."1 57
151. Id. at 66.
152. See discussion supra Section I.D.1.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (A) (i) (1994).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)(A) (ii) (1994).
155. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of Health Plans at 16, Great-West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. (No. 99-1786) (explaining that "[t]he Ninth Circuit's decision po-
tentially penalizes Ms. Knudson's fellow beneficiaries [because] ... premiums ... may rise
... and.., the employer sponsor may decide to either cut back its contribution .. .or
eliminate the health benefit plan altogether").
156. Similar to the example of Acme Company.
157. Brief of the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas' Health & Welfare
Fund as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9, Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co.
(No. 99-1786).
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HI. Solution: Subrogation Provisions Should Be Enforceable
Under ERISA § 502(a)(3)
A. ERISA Mandates the Uniform Enforcement of Plan Terms
By classifying the enforcement of subrogation provisions as "ap-
propriate equitable relief," fiduciaries will be able to fulfill their duties
under plans, including administering plans according to their provi-
sions. Explicitly, ERISA requires that fiduciaries maintain their plans
"pursuant to a written instrument" 158 which includes any subrogation
provisions. 159 Further, ERISA requires fiduciaries to administer plans
"in accordance with [those] documents and instruments governing
the plan."' 60 In order for fiduciaries to fulfill this duty, plan terms,
including subrogation provisions, must be enforceable under ERISA
§ 502(a) (3). Finally, one participant (Edgar) should not be allowed to
retain benefits belonging to the plan, while another (Susan) is held to
the terms of the plan-all participants must be uniformly held to the
terms of the plan.
B. Enforcement of Subrogation Provisions Is Appropriate
Equitable Relief
Though the Court in Mertens undertook the task of interpreting
"appropriate equitable relief" in ERISA § 502 (a) (3), the relief sought
in Mertens was not the enforcement of plan terms, but rather damages
sought for a breach of fiduciary duty. Crucially, the Court observed
that Section 502(a) (3):
Does not ... authorize "appropriate equitable relief' at large, but
only "appropriate equitable relief' for the purpose of "redress[ing
any] violations or ... enforc[ing] any provisions" of ERISA or an
ERISA plan. No one suggests that any term of the.., plan has been
violated, nor would any be enforced by the requested judgment. 16 1
This language clearly shows that where the enforcement of plan terms
is at issue, the Court and Section 502(a) (3) authorize such
enforcement.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994).
159. The participant is required to be provided with a Summary Plan Description
which must include a "statement clearly identifying circumstances which may result in ...
offset, reduction, or recovery (e.g., by exercise of subrogation or reimbursement rights) of
any benefits that a participant ... might otherwise expect the plan to provide ...." Con-
tents to Summary Plan Description, 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(1) (2001). Thus, a participant
has notice if the plan contains a subrogation provision.
160. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1994).
161. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 253 (1993).
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The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that money damages result when
subrogation terms are enforced-and therefore the relief sought is
not equitable-is an irrational one. 162 Allowing the enforcement of sub-
rogation provisions is equitable relief (not monetary damages and there-
fore legal relie) because:
The object of subrogation is the prevention of injustice. It is de-
signed to promote and accomplish justice, and is the mode which
equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one,
who, injustice, equity, and good conscience, should pay it. It is an
appropriate means of preventing unjust enrichment. The doctrine
of subrogation is applied to . . . do equity in the particular case
under consideration. 163
Other circuits agree that subrogation provisions are enforceable
under Section 502(a) (3) because such enforcement does constitute eq-
uitable relief. The Eighth Circuit has held that specific performance
of a plan's subrogation provision is an equitable remedy under ERISA
§ 502(a) (3).164 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit's rationale and held that a plan fiduciary seeking to enforce a
plan's subrogation provision was indeed seeking equitable relief.' 65
"Our circuit has consistently held that a complaint purporting to state
a claim for equitable relief under a reimbursement clause in a benefits
contract is an equitable claim for purposes of ERISA § 502(a) (3). ' 166
This approach is the correct approach.
The Ninth Circuit observed that "the Court in Mertens looked to
the substance of the remedy sought ... rather than the label placed on
that remedy."' 67 ERISA § 502 (a) (3) makes it clear that a suit may be
brought "to enforce ... the terms of the plan."168 Thus, regardless of
how the claim is framed ("specific performance, disgorgement, resti-
162. The classification of legal versus equitable relief may no longer be striking: "It is
believed that the distinction [between legal and equitable rights], regarded as a fundamen-
tal and necessary distinction between kinds of rights, is an illusion and . . . should no
longer be used in classifying legal relations." ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 779K 740 (West 1952).
163. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1265 845 (W. Jaeger
eds., 3d ed. 1967).
164. See S. Council of Indus. Workers v. Ford, 83 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1996).
165. SeeAdmin. Comm. v. Gauf, 188 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1999) ("the Committee is
seeking an equitable remedy against Ms. Gauf to ensure her compliance with the terms of
the Plan").
166. Id. at 771.
167. FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Watkins v.
Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1528 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis added).
168. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3) (B) (1994).
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tution, reimbursement, constructive trust, etc."), 69 a claim to enforce
a subrogation provision is equitable relief under ERISA § 502(a) (3).
Conclusion
The Supreme Court recently reiterated ERISA's goal of uniform-
ity: "[o]ne of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers 'to
establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of
standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement
of benefits.' Uniformity is impossible, however, if plans are subject to
different legal obligations in different States.' 170  As discussed
throughout this Comment, under the current state of the law, a plan
with participants in different states may be faced with the "different
legal obligations" that Congress sought to avoid in enacting ERISA.
Further, ERISA unambiguously mandates that plans be main-
tained pursuant to the plan documents. ' 71 "A primary purpose of ER-
ISA is to ensure the integrity and primacy of the written plans."' 72
Since ERISA does not preclude the use of subrogation provisions in
welfare benefit plans, the proper interpretation of Section 502(a) (3)
allows for the enforcement of such provisions.
The Court will soon have the opportunity to clarify its Mertens
holding in the subrogation context when it considers the Ninth Cir-
cuit case, Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson.173 Consis-
tent with the goals and mandates of ERISA, the Court should hold
that the enforcement of subrogation provisions is authorized by ER-
ISA § 502(a) (3) as appropriate equitable relief.
169. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Subrogation Prof'ls, Inc. in Support of
Petitioners at 11 n.12, Great-West Life &Annuity Ins. Co. (No. 99-1786) ("Terminology aside,
it is clear that the plan and the employer wanted the court to order the participant to
restore funds to the plans as required by the terms of the plan. This could be characterized
as specific performance, disgorgement, restitution, reimbursement, constructive trust, etc.
170. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, No. 99-1529, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2458, at *13 (March 21, 2001)
(quoting Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)). See also FMC Corp. v. Hol-
liday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990) (observing: "Application of differing state subrogation laws to
plans would ... frustrate plan administrators' continuing obligation to calculate uniform
benefit levels nationwide.").
171. See29 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1)(D) (1994).
172. IBP, Inc. v. Foust, 987 F. Supp. 714, 720 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
173. No. 98-56472, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1771 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000), cert. granted,
2001 U.S. LEXIS 945 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2001) (No. 99-1786).
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